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Doctors’ Fees in Ireland Following the Change in
Reimbursement: Did They Jump?
DAVID MADDEN
University College Dublin
Abstract: This paper analyses the pure time-series properties of doctors’ fees in Ireland to assess
whether a structural change in the series is observed at the time of the change in reimbursement
in 1989. Such a break would be consistent with doctors responding to the reimbursement change
in a manner predicted by supplier-induced-demand behaviour and would provide indirect
evidence that such inducement had taken place. Structural change is assessed on the basis of
CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests. The data is also analysed for the presence of unusually influential
observations. In neither case are the results consistent with a break around the time of the
introduction of the change.
I INTRODUCTION
I
n a recent paper Madden, Nolan and Nolan (2005, henceforth MNN)
explored the extent to which visiting patterns to General Practitioners in
Ireland changed following a change in reimbursement. More specifically, in
Ireland, individuals below an income threshold, termed “medical card
patients”, are entitled to free GP consultations while the remainder of the
population, termed “private patients”, must pay the full cost of each
consultation. Prior to 1989, GPs were reimbursed on a fee-per-service basis for
both medical card and private patients, by the state and the patient
respectively. In part in response to evidence in favour of demand inducement
presented by Tussing (1983; 1985), the reimbursement system for medical
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removing any incentive for GPs to induce visits from medical-card patients.
MNN examined the “difference-in-differences” between medical card and non-
medical card visits before and after the change in reimbursement. The results
showed that visits by both private and medical card patients fell and hence the
differential in visiting rates did not narrow, as might have been anticipated if
supplier induced demand played a major role.
One factor which MNN were unable to take account of was whether,
following the change in reimbursement, GPs increased their fees for 
private patients to offset any loss in induced demand from medical-card
patients. Failure to take account of this implies that some form of supplier-
induced demand for medical card patients prior to 1989 cannot be
unambiguously ruled out. This is because while the change in reimbursement
was introduced with the intention of lowering medical-card patients’ visits
(and evidence suggests that it succeeded in this in the short run at least),
doctors may have responded to their loss of income from this form of
inducement by raising fees for non-medical card patients. If GP visits for non-
medical patients are price inelastic, as is typically assumed, then such a
course of action would have led to increased revenue from private patients, yet
no narrowing of the visiting differential since visits from both groups would
have fallen.
Unfortunately, MNN were unable to explicitly control for such an effect
since their data listed GP visits on an annual basis (i.e. numbers per year for
each individual) and so it was not possible to assign individual visits to the
particular month or quarter. In the absence of sufficient time variation it was
not possible to condition on price in the analysis.
In this note we utilise an alternative data source and approach to
investigate the evolution of doctors’ fees over time. In particular, we examine
whether any form of break or discontinuity (we define precisely what we mean
by this below) can be observed in the time-series data on doctors’ fees around
the time the change in reimbursement was introduced. If such a break is
observed then it is consistent with doctors responding to the change in
reimbursement by raising private patients’fees. In turn this could be regarded
as a classic reaction to a situation where inducement had previously existed,
but where the scope for such inducement had been diminished by the change
in reimbursement.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we
describe our data source and the methodology we employ to detect any break
in the time-series on doctors’ fees. In Section III we present our results and in
Section IV we offer concluding comments.
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This section describes our data and methodology. The data we use is
quarterly data on doctors’ fees from 1983 Q1 to 2003 Q3 provided by the Irish
Central Statistics Office. This index is a sub-component of the overall
Consumer Price Index. To obtain the change in the real price of doctors’ fees
we deflate the index for doctors’ fees by the index for all items. Figure 1 shows
the change in the real price of doctors’ fees from 1983 to 2003 (indexed at 100
for 1983 Q1).
Figure 1: Doctors’ Fees, Quarterly, 1983 Q1 = 100
Purely eye-balling the graph we see that doctors’ fees (in real terms)
stayed constant from early 1983 to about the last quarter of 1985. We then see
the index start to increase and there is some evidence of a slight “blip”
upwards in the first quarter of 1989, but this seems to be followed by a
levelling off for the rest of 1989. From then on the rate of increase is
reasonably constant (though there is some evidence that it picks up around
the end of 2000) with evidence of other occasional blips e.g., 1992 Q1, 1999 Q1
and, in particular, 2002 Q1. The fact that most of the blips occur in Q1 may
indicate some seasonality in price setting (i.e. GPs change their fees at the

















































































































































































05 Madden article  13/09/2007  11:17  Page 261beginning of every year) and the particularly large rise in 2002 Q1 may reflect
the changeover to the euro.1 We return to this below.
While eye-balling the data can be revealing in terms of suggesting possible
breaks, it is also desirable to test for such breaks more formally. We adopt two
approaches here: first of all we search for any observations which appear to be
unusually influential and second we formally test for structural breaks.
Taking influential observations first, following the discussion in Belsley,
Kuh and Welsch (1980) we can think in terms of three key issues in identifying
model sensitivity to individual observations. These are residuals, leverage and
influence.  Any given data point with a large residual is an outlier and clearly
there is concern that such outliers will exert undue influence upon estimated
coefficients.
However, large residuals are not the only way in which individual points
can affect estimates unduly. In the same way that the actual and estimated
values of the dependent variable can be far apart it is also possible that some
individual values of the independent variable may be far apart from the mass
of other values.
In Figure 2 we have a scatterplot of y against x such that all points are
located in a mass concentrated in the ellipse in the lower left side of the
diagram, apart from a single point (xj, yj) in the top right-hand corner. The
dashed line shows the estimated regression line obtained, which clearly comes
very close to the point (xj, yj). Thus (xj, yj) is not an outlier in the sense of
having a large residual, yet it has a dramatic effect on the estimated slope of
the regression line, since if this point was deleted then the estimates would
change markedly. In this case, the point (xj, yj) is said to have high leverage.
Figure 2: Leverage
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1 In January 2002 Ireland, along with a number of other nations in the EU, adopted the euro as
its currency. This led to many prices being “rounded” up or down. A rounding up of doctors’ fees
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residuals or a high degree of leverage. Belsley, Kuh and Welsh (1980) suggests
a variety of statistics which can be used to detect influential observations. 
The particular statistics we adopt are: leverage; standardised residual;
studentised residual; DFITS; Cook’s Distance; Welsch’s Distance; various
DFBETA statistics and the covariance ratio. Leverage, studentised and
standardised residuals and the DFBETA statistics essentially examine the
significance of individual observations on estimated regression coefficients.
The DFITS, Cook’s Distance and Welsch’s Distance measures address
essentially the same issue except that they examine the sensitivity of the
predicted values of the dependent variable to individual observations while
the covariance ratio addresses the influence of individual observations on the
variance-covariance matrix of the estimates.2
Table 1: Residuals and Leverage Tables
Quadratic Cubic Quartic
Residual 1993q3   4.041 1983q1   4.159 1994q2   3.326
1994q2   4.076 1994q2   4.314 1994q1   3.567
1994q1   4.418 1994q1   4.598 2001q4   4.052
2002q2   5.803 2002q2   5.249 2002q2   5.157
2002q1  11.107 2002q1  10.714 2002q1  10.940
Leverage 1983q3   .085 2003q1   .122 2003q1   .1477
2003q2   .094 2003q2   .147 2003q2   .196
1983q2   .094 1983q2   .147 1983q2   .196
2003q3   .103 2003q3   .176 2003q3   .262
1983q1   .103 1983q1   .176 1983q1   .262
Standardised Residual 1993q3   1.615 1994q2   1.772 1994q2   1.492
1994q2   1.628 1983q1   1.856 1994q1   1.600
1994q1   1.765 1994q1   1.888 2001q4   1.833
2002q2   2.363 2002q2   2.207 2002q2   2.352
2002q1   4.509 2002q1   4.479 2002q1   4.963
Studentised 1993q3   1.632 1994q2   1.797 1994q2   1.504
Residual 1994q2   1.646 1983q1   1.886 1994q1   1.617
1994q1   1.789 1994q1   1.920 2001q4   1.861
2002q2   2.435 2002q2   2.264 2002q2   2.424
2002q1   5.188 2002q1   5.153 2002q1   5.961
2 The interested reader is referred to Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) for details.
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Table 2: DFITS, Cook’s Distance, Welsch’s Distance and COVRATIO Tables
Quadratic Cubic Quartic
DFITS 2002q3 .417 1983q2 .485 1983q1 .483
2002q2 .632 1983q1 .873 2001q4 .457
2002q1 1.277 2002q2 .632 2002q2 .678
2002q1 1.323 2002q1 1.539
Cook’s Distance 2002q3 .057 2003q2 .090 2003q2 .320
2002q2 .125 2003q3 .049 2003q3 .413
2002q1 .411 1983q2 .059 2003q1 .062
1983q1 .184 2002q2 .086
2002q2 .095 2002q1 .328
2002q1 .330
Welsch’s Distance 2002q2 5.912 1983q1 8.706 2002q2 6.372
2002q1 11.911 2002q1 12.365 2002q1 14.390
DFBETA (q) 2002q1 –.673 2002q1 .290 2003q2 .576
2002q2 –.354 1998q3 .220 2003q3 .755
1994q1 .220 1983q1 –.614 1983q1 –.307
2002q3 –.246 2003q2 –.326
1983q1 –.288 1983q2 –.322
2003q3 –.259
DFBETA (q2) 2002q1 .744 2002q1 –.324 2003q2 –.601
2002q2 .388 1998q3 –.225 2003q3 –.785
2002q3 .269 1983q1 .586 1983q1 .296
1983q1 .271 2003q2 .344
1983q2 .306
2003q3 .272
DFBETA (q3) 2002q1 .364 2003q2 .626
2002q2 .226 2003q3 .815









COVRATIO 1983q4 1.125 2002q1 .347 2002q1 .1706
1983q2 1.133 1983q2 1.151 2002q2 .796
2003q1 1.134 1983q4 1.167 2003q2 .854
1983q3 1.135 2002q4 1.172 1984q1 1.168
2003q3 1.155 2003q1 1.176 2002q4 1.186
1983q3 1.187 1983q4 1.201
2003q3 1.219 1983q3 1.249
1983q2 1.315
1983q1 1.384
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observations is to examine the data for a structural shift in the estimated
relationship. Perhaps the best known of such tests is the Chow test. However,
a problem with the Chow test is that while it can tell whether the relationship
has changed for two different periods with the cut-off date chosen arbitrarily,
it does not identify when exactly the relationship begins to change.
A potentially more useful approach is to examine the recursive residuals
from the regression (see Brown et al., 1975, and Galpin and Hawkins, 1984).
These are the residuals obtained after discarding successive observations
(starting with the last) and calculating the (standardised) residual of the last
observation from the new line. The examination of plots of the recursive
residuals can be extremely useful in detecting a “change in regime” in the
regression model. Brown et al. (1975) suggest plotting the cumulative sums
(CUSUM) of the recursive residuals and if all the regression assumptions are
satisfied then the plot of these residuals should be a random walk within a
parabolic envelope (where the borders of the envelope can reflect significance
levels) about the origin.3
Complementary to the CUSUM plot is that of the CUSUM of squares
which is particularly useful when departures from constancy of the estimated
regression coefficients is haphazard rather than systematic. 
In the next section we present values of the above statistics for influential
observations and for structural breaks for the case of doctors’ fees. We are
concerned only with the pure time-series properties of doctors’ fees, hence our
regression model will only have time and higher order terms in time as
explanatory variables. Ideally, we would like to estimate a structural or even
reduced form of inverse demand function whereby doctors’ fees would depend
upon such factors as underlying health, supply of GPs etc. Such data is simply
not available and so we concentrate purely on the time series properties of
doctors’ fees.
There are a variety of models we could estimate to investigate the pure
time-series properties of doctors’fees. Perhaps the simplest is where we simply
let doctors’fees depend upon an n-th order polynomial in time. For comparison
we include results for a quadratic, cubic and quartic in time. For the case of
leverage, standardised residuals and studentised residuals we present those
observations with the five highest values. For the other statistics outlined
DOCTORS’ FEES IN IRELAND 265
3 The CUSUM approach may be regarded as an example of a generalised fluctuation test which
does not assume a particular type of deviation from the null hypothesis of no structural change.
This may be contrasted with approaches which test for specific alternatives in terms of the
number of structural changes (e.g., Bai and Perron, 1998, 2003). For a general discussion see
Zeileis et al. (2003) and Perron (2005).
05 Madden article  13/09/2007  11:17  Page 265above we list those observations in excess of the critical values suggested by
Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980).
III RESULTS
The results for influential observations do not lend any support to the idea
that 1989 is in any way “different” in the sense that the relationship between
doctors’ fees and time is unduly influenced by events in this year. In no case
does an observation from 1989 exceed the critical value, nor are they ranked
high in terms of leverage or the standardised or studentised residuals. Are
there any observations which consistently appear to be influential? In terms
of residuals, it is clear that the first two quarters of 2002 and, to a lesser
extent, of 1994 are outliers. As suggested above, the behaviour of doctors’ fees
in early 2002 is probably due to rounding up following the introduction of the
euro. A possible explanation for the higher residuals in 1994 is that some
doctors may have invested in premises and developed group practices arising
from some of the suggestions contained in the blueprint policy document The
Future of General Practice in Ireland (Department of Health, 1991).4
In terms of leverage, the greatest influence is exerted by observations at
the beginning and end of the sample period. In the case of the various
measures combining residuals and leverage, the influence of large outliers
appears to dominate that of observations with high leverage. Hence, 2002 Q1
has the highest value of DFITS, Cook’s and Welsch’s Distance. For COVRATIO
it is generally those observations with highest leverage which exert the most
influence.
Turning now to the results for structural breaks, when we calculate the
Chow statistic above for the quadratic, cubic and quartic in time for our data
using 1989 Q1 as the date for the structural shift we obtain F values of 125.74,
117.24 and 100.01 respectively, clearly rejecting the null hypothesis that there
is no structural shift. So, is this clear evidence that doctors’ fees did take a
jump in 1989? Not really, since if we calculate the same statistic for different
dates, chosen somewhat randomly, then we also obtain high F values. For
example, choosing 1986 Q1 we obtain F values of 129.19, 119.41 and 96.74
respectively, while choosing 1995 Q1 we obtain 97.63, 78.57 and 79.48. Thus
while the Chow Test can tell whether the relationship has changed for two
different periods with the cut-off date chosen arbitrarily, it does not identify
when exactly the relationship begins to change.
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4 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. For details on the extent to which GPs
have moved towards group practices in recent years see Structure of General Practice in Ireland,
1982-2005 (O’Dowd et al., 2006).
05 Madden article  13/09/2007  11:17  Page 266In Figures 3 to 10 we present the plots of the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ for
the different regression models estimated for doctors’ fees, while in Table 3 
we show for what quarter, if any, the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ plots move
outside the 95 per cent confidence intervals and for what quarter, if any, they
move back inside the limits. 
Table 3: “Break-Out” Quarters for Doctors’ Fees
Break Out Quarters
Linear Quadratic Cubic Quartic
CUSUM 1993 q2 1997 q4 2001 q4 –
CUSUMSQ 1988 q1 1988 q2 1988 q2 1988 q3
Break In  Quarters
Linear Quadratic Cubic Quartic
CUSUM – 1999 q3 – –
CUSUMSQ 2002 q2 2002 q1 2002 q1 2003 q1










Figure 3: CUSUM Plot for Linear Regression Against Time
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change may have occurred. Those for CUSUMSQ do show consistency, with
evidence of a change in regime sometime in 1988 (see Figures 4, 6, 8 and 10).
This, however, pre-dates the change in reimbursement. This raises the
intriguing possibility that doctors anticipated the change in reimbursement
regime. Given the debate within the medical profession in the lead-up to the
change in reimbursement, it is clear that most GPs would have been aware of
the broad details of the scheme before it was actually implemented and it is
possible that they may have raised fees before implementation.5
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5 While there was a strong majority of doctors in favour of the change, the implementation of the
system was delayed as some Dublin based GPs argued that the new reimbursement system
favoured rural GPs while others argued that since the deal was negotiated between the
Department of Health and the Irish Medical Organisation (IMO) and they were not members of



















Figure 4: CUSUMSQ Plot for Linear Regression Against Time
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This paper has approached the issue of supplier-induced demand in the
Irish health system from a slightly unusual angle. Following on from the
investigation by MNN of the natural experiment of the change in
reimbursement in early 1989, an analysis of the time-series properties of
doctors’ fees gives no indication that there was any unusual upwards “blip”
around about the time the reimbursement change was introduced, despite the
incentive for such a rise. Are there any plausible reasons as to why this might
be the case? 
First of all there is the possibility pointed out above that doctors may have
anticipated the change in regime and increased fees before the new
reimbursement system was introduced. Evidence for this possibility comes
from the results of the CUSUMSQ test which shows some evidence of a regime
switch in 1988. However, for the linear, quadratic and cubic versions of the
CUSUMSQ test, the change in regime appears to occur in the first half of
1988. This is about three to six months before the controversy over the new
regime arose so it could be argued that the degree of anticipation shown by
doctors is not credible.
An alternative possibility is that while the change in reimbursement
system reduced the incentives to induce demand at the margin for medical
card patients, it still led to an overall increase in doctors’ incomes and hence if
doctors obeyed the “target income” hypothesis there would have been no need
for any offsetting increases in private patients’ fees. The fee-for-service
arrangement cost the Department of Health IR£39 million in 1987 and the
capitation fee system was predicted to cost IR£53 million in addition to
providing extra benefits such as pension arrangements, holiday pay, sick leave
etc. Thus it could be argued that the new regime provided not just higher
pecuniary rewards but also additional non-pecuniary benefits, and it is
noteworthy that amongst doctors there was a 68 per cent vote in favour of
accepting the deal (Irish Independent, September 8, 1988b). If the new
reimbursement regime was very favourable to doctors then it could explain
why visits from both medical card and private patients fell following the
reimbursement change.
Finally, the analysis concludes that to the extent that any period could be
identified where doctors fees did appear to behave unusually it was 2002 Q1,
the period when the changeover to the euro occurred and when there was some
anecdotal evidence of prices being rounded up.
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